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Drawing on the example of self-driving and connected cars, this chapter explores how the software 
that is being integrated into, and transforming, everyday objects, might be conceptualised within 
theories of practice. It argues that, although software is an especially dynamic and intangible 
‘material’, it can still be accommodated within existing conceptualisations of materiality in practice 
theories. The automation that software enables can be positioned as part of practice complexes, 
even when it does not play a direct, constitutive role in any single practice. In addition, through 
performing varied work in connecting practices and enabling ‘feedback’ over time and space, 
software can be understood to form part of the connective tissue by which practice complexes hang 





In its own right, software has become a topic of social science research, not just as a black-boxed 
component of the devices, infrastructures and systems that it enables. By unpacking and peering 
into the processes by which software is made and by which it operates in everyday life, researchers 
are exploring the distinctive ‘work’ that software does in the world: they are asking how “software 
matters” (Kitchin and Dodge 2011, 3). To date, this has included research into algorithms and their 
roles in political, personal and work life (Gillespie, Boczkowski, and Foot 2014, Zarsky 2015, Pasquale 
2015, Beer 2017), the production of software (Mackenzie 2006), its introduction and embedding into 
organisational settings (Pollock and Williams 2008), and its role in the production of urban space 
(Thrift and French 2002, Kitchin and Perng 2016). Many writers have also grappled with the nature 
of software itself, and the distinctive challenges it poses for thinking about technological agencies 
(Thrift 2004, Leonardi 2010, Berry 2011, Kitchin and Dodge 2011). For instance, software is seen to 
have dynamic, almost living, qualities that render the world “increasingly lively” (Thrift 2004, 461)  
 
For theories of practice, software is a challenging ‘material’ to conceptualise and study. This is, 
firstly, because some forms of software ‘enliven’ and automate processes in complex ways that 
reduce, remove or otherwise de-centre the active and practical doings of people. Yet practice 
theories, such as those of Schatkzi (2002, 2010) and Shove, Pantzar and Watson (2012) on which I 
focus in this chapter, emphasise direct bodily activity as the very basis of practices, and therefore of 
social life, stability and change. So how is software, and the automated work it does in the world, to 
figure within these approaches? 
 
The second challenge for theories of practice arises in the unusually dynamic nature of software 
itself: many forms of software can change in significant ways as they are used. In particular, software 
can be responsive to aggregate, past interactions or live data from beyond the immediate 
environment, bringing this to bear within situated performances. It can be updated remotely, 
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globally and quickly in ways that significantly change what objects or systems do. Some forms of 
software also ‘learn’ by themselves, as code is re-written through machine learning, without 
immediate oversight from people. In many applications of practice theory, particularly within studies 
of consumption, there is a tendency to define ‘materiality’ as comprised of discrete, relatively static 
and bounded objects: often limited to the “things handled in a social practice” (Reckwitz 2002, 221). 
Yet software is not well-bounded, nor is it tangible or fixed in the way that objects like cups, bicycles 
or buildings are.   
 
In addressing these two related challenges, this chapter argues that Schatzki’s (2002, 2010) and 
Shove, Pantzar and Watson’s (2012) versions of practice theory are not necessarily at odds with the 
idea of a dynamic materiality that is ‘active’ beyond moments of direct human practical activity. 
Indeed, such material doings, happenings or processes often provide necessary conditions for 
performances. Moreover, the apparent degree of autonomous ‘performance’, or the work that 
software does, appears less independent from practices once it is considered as part of wider 
complexes (Shove, Pantzar, and Watson 2012) or systems of practice (Watson 2012). If the aim is a 
fuller consideration of the work that software does, it is therefore necessary to explore how 
software is positioned in relation to a range of practices within such complexes. This shifts the focus 
beyond the single practices which appear to be ‘taken over’ and ‘carried on’ by software 
technologies, and thereby the question of whether such technologies are performing these 
practices.  
 
To develop an alternative, and relational, response to the automating and dynamically adaptive 
qualities of software, the chapter explores how software acts as a kind of connective tissue between 
practices: implicated in how practice complexes reproduce and extend over time. In this light, 
software appears to play a distinctive role compared to more fixed, object-like technologies, raising 
new lines of enquiry into how software matters.  
 
Overall, the chapter responds to two key themes of the present volume: the question of how to 
account for ‘non-human performance’ within theories of practice and the relations that dynamic 
‘materials’ facilitate between practices. The first section of the chapter delineates different types of 
software and identifies a handful of qualities that are of particular interest when internet-connected 
software is integrated into familiar everyday objects. These include a) the data-based extension and 
re-making of networks which link domestic and private practices to those of service providers, 
regulators and other organisations; b) the responsive adaptivity of software; and c) the fluid and 
rapid ways in which it circulates. This is illustrated through the case of self-driving and connected 
vehicles. The chapter then moves to the question of whether, and how, such qualities can be 
accommodated within theories of practice. After arguing that this is possible by attending to the 
relations between software and practices, the third section explores one approach to this: how 
software might be conceptualised as part of the ‘connective tissue’ through which practices hang 
together and extend over time. Finally, the chapter concludes with reflections on how this may help 
to orient empirical investigations of how software comes to matter, including understandings of 
large-scale, systemic change.  
 
Soft dynamics and self-driving cars 
 
Software infuses everyday life in diverse ways and through many different kinds of devices, 
infrastructures and assemblages that “mediate, supplement, augment, monitor, regulate, and 
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ultimately produce collective life” (Kitchin and Dodge 2011, 9). To help situate and differentiate 
these varied roles, Dodge and Kitchin (2009) propose a taxonomy of ‘coded’ objects in which 
software is embedded. This includes: objects such as cookers that do not depend on code for their 
operation but are ‘peripherally coded’ enabling supplementary functions like timers; and objects, 
referred to as ‘codejects’, that only function through code. This can be in more or less extensive and 
connected ways. For instance, some codejects, such as USB memory sticks, have firmware that is 
hard-wired and static; some codejects, like DVD players are programmable but in relatively fixed 
ways; and other codejects, like air conditioning units, detect and respond to their immediate 
environment. Further coded objects, referred to as ‘logjects’, monitor and record their own use. 
Some of these, like MP3 players, are relatively stand-alone whilst others, such as smartphones, are 
more dependent on networked connections in order to function fully. This latter category are 
‘networked logjects’, and it is through them, in particular, that software transgresses the boundaries 
of otherwise self-contained objects, connecting them and traces of their use to networks that 
extend, often instantaneously, over space.  
 
With the arrival of the Internet of Things (IoT), code is increasingly folded into existing categories of 
everyday objects, like thermostats, TVs and cars (Macrorie, Kragh-Furbo, and Morley 2016); 
endowing them with a range of properties (and concerns) previously restricted to computer-like 
devices, such as smartphones and laptops, and the online services to which they allow access. So 
although software already matters in many ways, the extension of software into further realms of 
everyday life, and into previously well-bounded objects, raises new questions as to how practice 
theoretical approaches might conceptualise and investigate software. Quite unlike the object-like 
artefacts that applications of practice theory are more used to dealing with, these new kinds of 
software are associated with a range of ‘softer’, more fluid and responsive dynamics. 
 
In this chapter, I illustrate these dynamics by focusing on a particular networked logject: the car. In 
itself, the integration of software into cars is nothing new: most cars are already codejects which 
depend on software to ‘drive’ functions like power-assisted breaking, diagnostic functions, and the 
navigation, entertainment and information ‘centres’. But as cars are increasingly designed to 
connect directly to mobile communications and Wi-Fi networks, this allows not only for Internet 
access to be provided for devices taken into the car, but also for diagnostic, navigation and 
entertainment systems to collect, send and receive data via the Internet.  
 
In some cases, connected tracking devices are added to cars and other vehicles for insurance, safety, 
navigation and logistics purposes. For instance, in the European Union, new cars sold from 2018 
onwards must be fitted with an emergency tracking system, called eCall, that will detect when an 
accident has occurred and automatically call the emergency services, sending data about the 
vehicle’s location, direction of travel and time of the crash (European Commission 2015). It is likely 
that this data will then be subject to a range of algorithmic operations, for instance, to predict the 
severity of injuries (Wallace 2017). 
 
Car companies are also starting to collect data from the vehicles they sell; but exactly what data can 
be unclear. Tesla, one of the most prominent companies in the development of self-driving cars, 
releases selected data in the event of accidents to show that the car itself was not at fault (Thielman 
2017). By implication, such data as is ordinarily captured and sent ‘back’ to Tesla provides a 
sufficiently rich picture of how each of ‘their’ cars is being driven and in what road conditions as to 
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diagnose blame. In Europe, where data protection laws are more stringent, Audi is also starting to 
collect data from cars in the company’s own fleet, before voluntarily enrolling wider populations. 
 
But why are car manufacturers like Tesla and Audi collecting data from connected cars? It seems it is 
essential to the development of ‘intelligent’ vehicles. For instance, Audi plans to develop ‘personal 
assistants’ that will make a range of suggestions, depending on traffic and weather conditions about 
when to leave for work, or to call home if you’re likely to be late (Gitlin 2016). Machine learning is 
key to these aspirations: it will allow software in the vehicle to monitor and infer a pattern of use as 
a basis for generating personalised suggestions for drivers. Just as with ‘learning thermostats’ like 
the Nest, this ‘tailored support’ will also adapt to incoming data about local conditions. The 
collection of data from current driving performances helps develop the algorithms that could 
eventually perform such assistance roles.  
 
More hotly anticipated and debated, however, is the development of autonomous or self-driving 
vehicles. Trials are currently underway in many countries, and connected cars and the data they are 
already collecting are key to these developments. Tesla’s Model S and Model X cars already run 
‘Autopilot’ software which allows for driver-supervised, hands-free driving on motorways. In early 
2017, the hardware of the latest Model S was declared to be ready for fully autonomous driving; it is 
just the software that remains to catch-up, as “it is still learning how to drive” (Stilgoe 2017, 1). This 
is through a process involving deep, machine learning operating on vast datasets generated from 
many actual performances of driving available to Tesla through their connected fleet. From this data, 
software can learn the ‘rules’ and generate algorithms that reliably replicate the same results as real 
drivers: each driver thereby becomes an “expert trainer for how the autopilot should work” 
(Fehrenbacher 2015, para. 7, quoted by Stilgoe, 2017). This doesn’t happen in an isolated car-by-car 
fashion: rather, according to Elon Musk, the head of the company, “[t]he whole Tesla fleet operates 
as a network. When one car learns something, they all learn it” (Fehrenbacher 2015, para. 7). 
 
In other words, this is a two way ‘feedback’ process. Not only does analysis of vast aggregated data 
from past driving performances inform the ongoing development of driving algorithms, but those 
algorithms are then fed back into all the cars on an ongoing basis, changing how they function. This 
responsive adaptation in functionality on a mass scale is possible because software is updateable. 
Results can be dramatic. Autopilot software was first rolled-out in 2015 to tens of thousands of 
vehicles already in use in the United States, via car owners’ Wi-Fi networks: turning them overnight 
into (partially) self-driving cars (McHugh 2015). When it is ready, the software for fully autonomous 
driving will be similarly distributed. This mass adaptation is not just a question of the updatability of 
software per se, but also the way in which updates can be circulated. Thanks to near-constant (or 
routine) broadband connectivity, much software is now designed to be updated automatically and 
frequently at a global scale (de Decker 2017).  
 
Compared to other non-coded material artefacts, software brings a remarkable dynamism to 
networked logjects. It means that objects like cars, and how they work, can be re-designed almost 
on the fly, much like apps or operating systems. Whilst this has become a familiar quality for 
computing devices, it brings potential for an increasing rate of change in the ‘physical’ functionality 
of everyday objects, and how they are used. Software can circulate and change in ways that are 
quite unlike physical products that have to be designed, tested, manufactured, shipped, stored, 
purchased and delivered: in other words, thanks to software, the scale and speed by which 
networked logjects may change transcends that of more ‘concrete’, self-contained technologies. 
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Thus, when it comes to developing accounts of change over time, this makes software an 
exceptionally interesting yet challenging ‘material’ to work with. It suggests, on the one hand, that 
software-based innovations like self-driving cars could bring widespread and rapid change to the 
practices in which networked logjects are embedded: to driving as well as other practices associated 
with car travel (McDonald 2016, Lin 2016). On the other hand, many changes in software proceed 
without discernible impact for the practices in which they are embedded; for instance, security 
requires a process of near-constant change to maintain stability within associated practices.     
 
In sum, this section has highlighted several of the qualities of software that underpin its status as a 
distinctively dynamic ‘material’. First, it highlighted the extended networks in which data and 
updates may flow to and from networked logjects like connected cars, serving as resources or inputs 
to practices of driving and a range of related practices, such as emergency services and car design 
and production. Second, it explained how software can adapt (itself) both locally and across whole 
fleets of vehicles in response to data about past performances of driving. Thirdly, it highlighted the 
significance of the rapid and global way in which software can circulate, and with it bring adapted 
forms of functionality to everyday objects, which may in turn enable rapid changes in practice. I 
contend that these properties represent modes of feedback that actively contribute to the 
reproduction of practice complexes in ways that would not be possible without software. Before 
developing this argument, however, I will briefly turn to the question, pertinent to the themes of this 
book, of whether and how practice theories can conceptualise the dynamic and apparently 
‘performative’ qualities of software outlined above.  
 
Accounting for the ‘dynamism’ and ‘agency’ of software 
 
In what follows, I will argue that the adaptive and fluid qualities of software are not incompatible 
with the way that practice theorists (in particular Schatzki (2010)) conceptualise materiality. The idea 
that ‘materials’ only feature as direct, object or even tool-like elements of practice performances is 
not necessarily the case. Instead, I suggest that materiality plays important roles as part of 
complexes of practice, even when not directly embedded in any single practice. This implies that the 
work that software does in the world – or what it ‘performs’ – can be understood through its 
relationality to multiple practices. Argued in this way, the question of whether automated 
technologies, like cars, perform practices, like driving, does not logically arise. Indeed, in the 
conclusion, I will suggest that it is something of a distraction from developing relational 
understandings of the work that software does, that is, its apparent ‘agency’.  
 
First, let us consider the status of software as ‘a material’. This term is drawn from Shove, Pantzar, 
and Watson (2012) and is more properly described as ‘a material element’. It refers to a category of 
component brought together in the performance of practices and necessary to them, alongside skill 
and meaning. This framework draws on Reckwitz (2002, 208) who notes that “’artefacts’ or ‘things’… 
necessarily participate in social practices just as human beings do”. In emphasising a practical 
engagement with the material world over an exclusively interpretive one, Reckwitz’s account of 
materiality within practice theory highlights “things” or “objects” that are “handled” in practices 
(2002, 212, 210). Given this, and given a lingering predilection in western thinking to conceptualise 
materiality in terms of discrete, fixed objects (Ingold 2010), it is not surprising that many who have 
worked with practice theories empirically have also tended to limit consideration of materiality to 




Yet software stands in stark contrast to this image of a thing or object. Firstly, the ways that it can 
respond flexibly to predefined data and ‘learn’ patterns of activity, including how to recreate 
human-like driving performances, resembles the characteristics of living organisms more than it 
does of objects (Thrift and French 2002, Thrift 2004). Secondly, software does not exist physically in 
the way that an object does. It is not physically tangible, yet it does have a physical substrate: it is 
stored and operates on disks or circuits of some kind. But these physical properties neither define it, 
nor do they shape the contours of possible actions that can be performed with or by it: which is the 
case for physical objects. Rather, software “exists in the way that speech or music exist… software 
when merely written as lines of code loses its essential essence – it’s executability” (Kitchin and 
Dodge 2011, 24). In other words, the essence of software is as a process, a doing: it “does something 
to something… it performs functions and processing” (Berry 2008, para. 1). 
 
However, whilst the adaptivity and process-like nature of software are at odds with the image of an 
object, neither of these characteristics is actually incompatible with understandings of materiality 
within practice theories. Indeed, Schatzki (2010) describes materiality as arrangements composed of 
physical, biological or natural “somethings” that include “objects, things, properties, events, or 
processes” (133, emphasis added). In this account, one way in which materiality forms part of society 
arises from the biological or physical flows that pass through arrangements and the practices with 
which they are interlinked (practice-arrangement nexuses). Thus, to Schatzki material arrangements 
are not as fixed or static as the name suggests: they “are in some sense crystallizations of matter-
energy flows” (Schatzki 2010, 137). This resonates with Ingold’s (2007, 2010) account of materials as 
immersed in processes of formation and transformation, as opposed to states of matter (see also 
Shove, Walker, and Brown 2014). In other words, it is not incompatible with practice theories for a 
material phenomenon like software to be dynamic, changeable, and responsive to situations, or 
even to do something.  
 
With the possibility for a dynamic materiality that goes beyond concepts of objects or artefacts 
established, the next step in arguing that software can largely be accommodated within the existing 
conceptual resources of practice theories is to note that material entities or processes need not be 
direct parts of the performance of practices in order to matter for, or relate to, them. This is to 
recognise a variety of roles for materiality beyond simple or direct, tool-like ‘elements’ of practice. 
Indeed, there are already a number of moves in this direction, for instance, in thinking through how 
infrastructures relate to practices (Shove, Watson, and Spurling 2015) or the different roles that the 
same material entities can play as relative to practices (Shove 2017). To Schatzki (2010, 2012) 
material arrangements and practices are inter-linked in many different ways: “practices effect, use, 
give meaning to, and are inseparable from arrangements while … arrangements channel, prefigure, 
facilitate, and are essential to practices” (2012, 4) through relations of causality, prefiguration, 
intelligibility, intentionality and constitution. In this light, software does not need to figure as a direct 
constitutive part of practices in order to feature in the way that practices and arrangements hang 
together, and thus how social life transpires. 
 
More specifically, I have argued elsewhere (Morley 2017) that automated machines may be 
conceptualised as part of processes, like manufacturing or heating, that are organised by, and cut 
across, many practices. Even if they do not perform a central device-like, resource-like or even 
infrastructural role (Shove 2017) in any single practice, automated machines can usually be 
understood to feature as a necessary component in a complex or system of practices. Like 
automated machines, software connects to multiple practices even those in which it is not directly 
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handled or ‘used’. Thus, the automated work that software allows for can also be accounted for, and 
studied, as part of complexes of practice. In fact, there is broader movement away from the analysis 
of single practices to that of multiplicities or complexes of practice and how they change (Schatzki 
2011, Shove, Pantzar, and Watson 2012, Blue and Spurling 2017, Blue 2017). 
 
From this perspective, the work that software does, particularly in automating complex 
technologies, needs to be understood as a relational outcome with reference to a range of practices. 
The very ability of software to do work in the world, to “carry, fold, frame and redistribute actions in 
different environments” (Mackenzie 2006, 423) might be seen as an extension of human agency, 
perhaps even human bodies (Wallenborn 2013). Mackenzie (2006) refers to this as secondary 
agency: the capacity to act ‘autonomously’ yet on behalf of a range of other actors, such as the 
companies, groups and programmers that build and deploy code, and the people in myriad 
situations who use it.  
 
The challenge of thinking about what software does, or its ‘agency’, is therefore one of thinking 
through relationships with and between practices. In echoing a number of other authors (Barad 
2003, Ingold 2007), I would suggest that the apparent ‘performative agency’ of software, such as 
when a Tesla car takes over the control of driving along a motorway, is not an inherent attribute of 
the software, or the car, itself: it does not have agency that then allows it to act. Rather, much like 
human agency, this action is realised and made possible only through the wider practice-
arrangement nexuses within which such cars are embedded. Whatever this work or action is, it has 
been established, is understood and has effect through practices, and the material arrangements to 
which they connect. In other words, if we want to better understand and conceptualise what self-
driving cars, and the software that ‘drives’ them, actually do, it is paramount to pay close attention 
to how software relates to practices and how it mediates relationships between them.  
 
Connective tissue: Software actively connects practices 
 
This section briefly explores the idea that at least some of the work that software does in relation to 
practices can be understood as a kind of connective tissue within practice complexes. The concept of 
connective tissue is used by Shove, Pantzar, and Watson (2012, 36) as that which “holds complex 
social arrangements in place, and potentially pulls them apart.” It is developed by Blue and Spurling 
(2017) in order to analyse how complexes of practice in hospitals change. In particular, they suggest 
that material-spatial qualities of practices, alongside jurisdictional and temporal qualities form 
interconnections within practice complexes.  
 
Based on the case of connected and self-driving cars, outlined above, it is certainly possible to 
appreciate how software contributes to making, and re-making, relationships between practices in 
each of these ways. Firstly, by including new data flows within the practice of driving, such as live 
navigational advice, and by sending new flows of data to car makers and emergency services, 
connected car software extends the material-spatial co-ordinates of driving. As Dodge and Kitchin 
(2009, 1359) observe for networked logjects in the home: 
“homes are being embedded in real-time, two-way networks so that the everyday nature of 
domestic practices… can be monitored by service providers with the attendant data being 
used to profile and social sort customers. The consequence of networked logjects is that 
homes are increasingly being stretched out across space in networks of greater and shorter 
length… and they are subject to increasing levels of (corporate) surveillance.” 
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With the arrival of connected cars, the same will be increasingly true for driving and its relation to 
other practices such as those of emergency services, insurers and the car industry. Secondly, this 
could have jurisdictional implications. Commentators note that regulating software-based driving is 
a very different prospect to that of human driving (Stilgoe 2017). Thirdly, software that enables live 
sharing of data with third parties and which automates driving has the potential to re-make the 
temporal connections that hold driving and other practices together. At the simplest level, traffic 
control measures or emergency services may be able to respond to incoming data over different 
(faster) time scales whilst other activities such as working might become possible when commuting 
by car. In other words, the ability of software to ‘rewire’ relationships between practices is 
testament to the way that it ‘performs’ these connections (or may do in the future).  
 
Shove, Pantzar, and Watson (2012, 17) propose that such connections within and between practices 
might also be understood as “circuits of reproduction through which one performance relates to the 
next and… through which practices shape each other”. Between practices, this shaping is referred to 
as ‘cross-referencing’. This denotes how multiplicities of practices (bundles and complexes) are held 
together, and might include temporal co-ordination, narrative-based organisation, or the ways that 
elements co-ordinate and link practices when they are shared, passed between practices or 
competed for. They also refer to forms of ‘monitoring’, recording and feedback that have 
constitutive roles in performances and feed forward from one performance to the next. If, and 
when, such forms of feedback cross-over with the circuits formed between practices, it is possible to 
envisage how circuits of reproduction may work across complexes as a whole. Understood like this, 
connective tissue is not just about how practices cohere, but also how complexes reproduce and 
change.  
 
In the first section of this chapter, I suggested that the dynamic characteristics of software (that 
situate technologies within extended data-based networks, that adapt to past performances, and 
that can be circulated near-instantaneously and globally) might be understood as forms of feedback 
within complexes of practice. In general, information technologies may already be implicated in 
‘rewiring’ the circuits of reproduction. In commenting on the concept of global microstructures 
developed by Knorr Cetina (2005), Shove, Pantzar, and Watson (2012, 117) suggest that:  
“the emergence of such modes may be symptomatic of a more pervasive transformation in the 
circuitry of society itself. Whether or not this is so, it is clear that technologies and instruments of 
feedback, broadly defined, are of direct relevance in configuring circuits of reproduction that are, 
in turn, of equally direct consequence for the survival and transformation of relations between 
practices and the elements of which they are composed.” 
Through its roles in communication technologies software already matters in this way. The 
extending role of software in everyday networked logjects prospectively takes this even further.  
 
In the case of connected and self-driving cars, software enables new possibilities for ‘feedback’ in 
the relations between practices described above. These software-enabled circuits of feedback go 
beyond the relationships between car ‘users’ and those who make, insure, regulate, maintain them 
or provide emergency assistance. They include circuits of feedback within practices, and practice 
complexes, from past to present or future performances. This can be seen in the local machine 
learning that Audi’s personal assistant software will depend upon, and in the aggregated, mass 
‘learning’ by which Tesla’s Autopilot software is evolving. Analytics performed on past performances 
are combined with analysis of incoming and live data, either to produce contextually specific ‘advice’ 
or to affect control of a car. These circuits extend both across time, connecting past to present 
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performances, and space, bringing to bear traces of data about the many other performances of 
driving that generate traffic conditions. In other words, software does indeed appear to 
simultaneously ‘perform’ multiple circuits of reproduction across ‘automobility’ complexes or 
systems (Urry 2004).  
 
Taking this idea further, we might suggest that it is the very re-making of connective tissues of the 
complexes surrounding driving, through which automated driving is becoming an increasingly real 
prospect. On the one hand, Stilgoe (2017) argues that the emphasis on machine learning makes self-
driving cars a much closer prospect by removing some of the previously assumed need to overhaul 
infrastructures to accommodate these new kinds of vehicles. The development of autonomous 
vehicles through machine-learning based on data of actual driving performances reduces the field of 
necessary change to one of technological substitution (or delegation) between human and non-
human driver. Yet, on the other hand, this apparent substitution, limited to the task of driving itself, 
can still be seen as a process of transformation in the connective tissue of automobility complexes. 
This is because it depends on making new relations of feedback between past performances of 
driving and the development of software, and in turn this depends upon new and different relations 
between drivers and car-makers as observed in the case of Tesla and their access to vast sets of data 
on what drivers do. 
 
In summary, when it comes to accounting for the software embedded in networked logjects, this 
section has argued that it is helpful to trace the modes of ‘feedback’ – between practices and 
between performances – that forge connections across complexes of practice. Indeed, I have 
suggested that this could be a useful approach for analysing the very development of self-driving 
technologies. These modes of feedback are an important aspect of the work that software does in 
the world, and it is worth stressing that this is not passively achieved, but actively ‘performed’ 
through the flows of data, software updates, analytics and algorithmic processing that make 




In drawing on self-driving and connected cars as an example of how software can matter in new 
ways, my aim has been two-fold. First, I have hoped to set-out and respond to some of the qualities 
of software that make it such an intriguing ‘material’, particularly for theories of practice that have 
hitherto been relatively limited in their conceptual and empirical treatment of material elements or 
arrangements as primarily consisting of a set of discrete, well-bounded, tangible and static objects. I 
have argued that this understanding of materiality is not inherent or necessary to practice theories. 
Rather, alternative and more promising directions are already present and emerging: in Schatzki’s 
(2010) description of material arrangements including processes and events, in Shove, Watson, and 
Spurling’s (2015) discussion of how infrastructures relate to practices, in Shove’s (2017) argument 
that materials occupy roles relative to the practices in question, and in Blue and Spurling’s (2017) 
account of materiality as an aspect of the connective tissue by which practice complexes hang 
together. In adding to these developments, I argue that the work that software does in the world 
can be defined in relation to complexes (or systems) of practice.  
 
Therefore, if we have an interest in understanding the distinctively dynamic qualities of software, 
and the work this makes possible - the ‘performative’ qualities of software - then the challenge is to 
understand the multiple relationships within practice complexes through which this work is done. To 
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reduce this to the question of whether vehicles or non-humans can perform social practices without 
humans, risks prematurely cutting out of view the richness of relationships, material and otherwise, 
in which driving is embedded. In itself, this is a fascinating topic to explore, as in other chapters in 
this volume (see Strengers, Kuijer). But, I would suggest that it is not the first question to ask of 
increasingly sophisticated and ‘smart’ technological developments like the self-driving car. Indeed, to 
be occupied only with the practice of driving and the re-distribution of performative work within the 
driver-car assemblage (Dant 2004) is to miss the work that software is doing to make this possible. 
This can only be understood through transformations in relations across wider systems of practice in 
which driving is embedded. To this end, it is helpful to conceptualise software as part of the 
connective tissue through which practices hang together. More specifically, software is plausibly 
involved in circuits of reproduction at the level of complexes.  
 
This remains a limited and speculative account of how software matters; it is also likely to matter 
through many other contributions to regulating, sustaining and reproducing practices. But I hope it 
indicates a direction of travel. Indeed, there is much more to do in thinking through the 
conceptualisation of connective tissue, and in developing empirically-founded analyses of how 
technologies, and not only software, are implicated in it. This marks a move away from a dominant 
focus on the direct roles that non-human materiality plays within single practices, towards 
consideration of indirect roles in stitching together practice complexes and the ways in which they 
reproduce, extend and change over time. This could help in developing practice theoretical accounts 
of ‘large’ social phenomena (Schatzki 2011) and systemic societal change. 
 
I have also noted the parallel that other authors have drawn between software and organic life. Even 
though software is a technology, and is crafted to carry on human intentionality and thus differs 
markedly from organic life or geo-physical processes, the approach to exploring indirect 
relationships in complexes or looser systems of practice, as sketched out in this chapter, may be 
helpful for analysing a range of other ‘non-humans’ and their contributions to social life, such as the 
weather, light, health or heat (see Opperman and Walker, this volume). Yet I also hope it is clear that 
the study of software in cases like the self-driving car, may serve as fruitful ground on which to 
further develop and substantiate the concept of connective tissue, through empirical investigation of 
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